Society · Coordination
CooperationHorizon#8806
Cooperation holds when interaction is repeated without a known end
Mechanism
In repeated games, tit-for-tat cooperation breaks down when the number of rounds is fixed and known, since defection in the last round unravels earlier ones. It survives when the end is unknown. Small communities in which people will meet for decades stay cooperative for the same reason, unlike strangers at a train station.
Invariants
- Cooperation depends on expected future interaction
- Known endpoints invite defection
Failure modes
- Anonymous one-shot interactions
- Endgame effects near a known termination
Used by
Identity
The name is the hash of the definition. Change a word and it becomes a different pattern.
- Sema ID
sema:CooperationHorizon#mh:SHA-256:8806b1a1cda732647179088e9a9abcab9572a11772ac8e977f4cd197e1187163- Reference
CooperationHorizon#8806- Ring
- 1
- Tier
- 2